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TEXT OF STATUTES AND CONSTITUTIONAL PROVISIONS
Utah Code Ann. § 58-37-8(1)(a)(ii) (Supp. 1989) (effective until
July 1, 1990) provides in pertinent part:
(1)

Prohibited acts A—Penalties:
(a) Except as authorized by this chapter, it
is unlawful for any person to knowingly and
intentionally:
(ii) distribute a controlled or
counterfeit substance, or to agree, consent,
offer, or arrange to distribute a controlled or
counterfeit substance.
Utah Code Ann. § 58-37-8(1)(a)(iv) (Supp. 1989) provides in
pertinent part:
(1)

Prohibited acts A—Penalties:
(a) Except as authorized by this act, it shall
be unlawful for any person to knowingly and
intentionally:
(iv) to agree, consent, offer, or arrange
to distribute or dispense a controlled
substance for value or to negotiate to have a
controlled substance distributed or dispensed
for value.
Utah Code Ann. § 76-4-20 (1953) provides in pertinent part:
Conspiracy—Elements of Offense—For purposes of
this part a person is guilty of conspiracy when he,
intending that conduct constituting a crime be
performed, agrees with one or more persons to engage
in or cause the performance of such conduct and any
one of them commits an overt act in pursuance of the
conspiracy . . . .

iv

IN THE COURT OF APPEALS OF THE STATE OF UTAH
THE STATE OF UTAH,
Plaintiff/Respondent,
v.
Case No. 890509-CA
Priority No. 2

DARRIN LAMAR PELTON,
Defendant/Appellant.

JURISDICTIONAL STATEMENT
Jurisdiction is conferred on this Court pursuant to Utah
Code Ann. § 77-35-26(2)(a) (Supp. 1989) and Utah Code Ann.
§ 78-2a-3(2)(f) (Supp. 1989), whereby a defendant in a district
court criminal action may take an appeal to the Court of Appeals
from a final judgment and conviction for any crime other than a
first degree or capital felony.

The Honorable Homer F. Wilkinson,

Judge, Third District Court in and for Salt Lake County, State of
Utah, presided over Appellant Darrin Lamar Pelton's bench trial and
rendered final judgment and conviction.

Mr. Pelton was convicted of

a second degree felony.

STATEMENT OF THE ISSUES
1.

Do the actions of Appellant Pelton constitute

"arrangements11 made in furtherance of the distribution of a
controlled substance?

(i.e. Did Appellant, a man who simply directed

an agent to a supposed meeting place where they were to wait for an
exchange, "arrange" the transaction when nothing transpired at the

(T. 8, 18, 19); Suppression Motion at 34.

In any case, Acosta,

Baker, Pelton, and Acosta's confidential informant then drove
together to the 7-Eleven (T. 8 ) . Once there, Baker and Pelton
exited Acosta's car (T. 8 ) . They never made the phone call nor was
the cocaine ever brought to the location (T. 9, 19, 20). They did
"[walk] up towards the phone booth at the 7-Eleven" (T. 9) where
they encountered Paco.

However, the prosecution did not prove the

contents of Paco's telephone conversation (or if he was even talking
to anyone) nor the discussion apparently entered into between Paco
and Pelton (T. 27). Pelton then walked to a pickup truck for his
ride home (T. 20, 33). Pelton had no further involvement or
discussions with Acosta (T. 20, 26) .
Meanwhile, Acosta, while still situated at the 7-Eleven,
had his informant contact Lorraine Coates (T. 9 ) . The informant
apparently contacted Coates, in person, at the 7-Eleven (T. 9 ) .
Acosta told Coates that he was uncomfortable with Baker and Pelton
and did not want them there (T. 22). Acosta then asked if he could
speak with Paco (T. 9, 22). Coates contacted Paco and told him that
Acosta wanted to speak directly to him (T. 9 ) . Paco approached
Acosta at the 7-Eleven and told him to proceed to a gas station on
1700 South and 1300 East (T. 10, 20). Acosta acknowledged that
"there [was] absolutely no dispute that Lorraine [Coates] made the
contact with Paco [who, in turn, contacted Acosta] and Paco made the
contact with the people in the house on 17th South where the cocaine
was" (T. 26). Paco, Coates and Acosta's informant then rode with
Acosta to the gas station (T. 10).
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Shortly thereafter, Paco and Acosta made an agreement in
which Acosta would give $600 to Paco, who would exchange the money
at a nearby location for a half ounce of cocaine (T. 12). After
receiving the money, Paco made several trips from Acosta7s car to
the house where the money and cocaine were apparently exchanged
(T. 12, 21, 22). Paco eventually returned to the car with the
cocaine (T. 12, 21). After receiving the cocaine, Acosta agreed to
"reward" Coates for arranging the deal (T. 23). No request was made
by anyone to similarly reward Pelton nor did Acosta agree to reward
Pelton for his "efforts" in "arranging" the deal.
Indeed, Pelton had never handled the cocaine (T. 24);
Pelton never directed Acosta to the house where the cocaine
transaction took place (T. 24); Acosta never paid Pelton for the
drugs (T. 2 4 ) ; Pelton never discussed cocaine prices with Acosta
(T. 24); and Pelton never discussed the quantity or quality of the
cocaine with Acosta (T. 24). Nevertheless, after the drug
transaction had been completed, Pelton was also arrested and charged
with arranging the distribution of a controlled substance.
The testimony of Appellant's mother, Lynn Pelton, indicated
that Appellant was in need of a ride home and had to rely on others
for transportation (T. 30, 39). Appellant did, in fact, arrange for
the ride (T. 19, 20, 33).
During the aforementioned events, Acosta was wearing an
"audio intelligence device" which transmitted all the conversations
to undercover narcotics agent Patrick McCarthy, who was in charge of
monitoring the recording device.

Suppression Motion at 7.
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However,

the tape recordings were never given to Appellant Pelton in
preparation for his defense.

Suppression Motion at 19, 38-39.

In a

proceeding subsequent to his arrest, Appellant moved for a court
order to either compel discovery of the recordings or, in the
alternative, suppress Defendant's statements from the trial
proceedings.
the motion.

Suppression Motion at 4, 26.

The trial court denied

Suppression Motion at 46.

Thereafter, during a bench trial tried before the Honorable
Homer F. Wilkinson, defense counsel objected to the relevancy and
admissibility of Exhibit 2, the controlled substance, which had
never been handled or received by Pelton (T. 28). It was Paco, not
Pelton, who had directed the agent to the house where the cocaine
was received (T. 26). Nevertheless, the trial court admitted the
exhibit into evidence (T. 28). The court subsequently convicted
Appellant Darrin Lamar Pelton under Utah Code Ann. § 58-37-1(a)(ii)
(Supp. 1989) (effective until July 1, 1990) for arranging the
distribution of a controlled substance.

SUMMARY OF THE ARGUMENT
Appellant Pelton did not "arrange" the distribution of a
controlled substance.

The facts presented at trial were

insufficient to establish that Mr. Pelton's behavior rose to the
level of culpable conduct of other defendants convicted for their
substantial and necessary role in arranging a drug transaction.
present, the statutory definition of "arranging" is boundless.

At
If

the statutory proscriptions are extended to include the actions or
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inactions of Mr. Pelton, the scope of the statute would dangerously
and unconstitutionally encompass completely innocent behavior.
The drug transaction occurred through the actions of others
and the "exchange" still would have occurred without Mr. Pelton.
The undercover agent, once directed to the supposed meeting place by
Mr. Pelton, grew impatient with the lack of activity and began the
operation anew by telling his informant to contact the involved drug
dealers.

The agent's voluntary reinitiation of the sting operation

nullified and superceded any prior "activity" of Mr. Pelton, a party
with no further "involvement" in the exchange.

STANDARD OF REVIEW
When an appellate court reviews the findings of a bench
trial, the findings are rejected if they are "clearly erroneous."
State v. Walker, 743 P.2d 191 (Utah 1987).

The clearly erroneous

standard differs from the "sufficiently inconclusive" or
"insubstantial" jury verdict standard because in the former, the
appellate court does not simply view the evidence "most favorable to
the appellee" or resolve all conflicts and inferences "in his
favor."

Compare Walker, 743 P.2d at 192-93, with State v. Petree,

659 P.2d 443, 444 (Utah 1983).

Rather,

[if] the trial court's verdict in a criminal case
[is] against the clear weight of the evidence, or if
the appellate court otherwise reaches a definite and
firm conviction that a mistake has been made,
the . . . verdict will be set aside.
Walker. 743 P.2d at 193.
In the bench trial before the Honorable Homer F. Wilkinson,
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Appellant Darrin Pelton was convicted under Utah Code Ann.
§ 58-37-1(a)(ii) for "arranging" the distribution of a controlled
substance.

The court made a mistake, however, because the actions

or inactions of the Appellant clearly fell short of the "arranging"
activities necessary for a conviction.

ARGUMENT
POINT
THE STATE FAILED TO PROVE THAT THE DEFENDANT
"ARRANGED" TO DISTRIBUTE A CONTROLLED SUBSTANCE.
The first issue centers around the definition of
"arranging," as defined under Utah Code Ann. § 58-37-8(1)(a)(ii),
and whether the actions of the Appellant, Darrin Pelton, were
improperly included within the proscriptions of the statute.

The

statute states, inter alia, "it is unlawful for any person to
knowingly and intentionally . . . arrange to distribute a controlled
or counterfeit substance."

Id.

"Arrange" has not been expressly

defined in Utah 1 though the prohibited perimeters of this type of
conduct have been announced in recent decisions.

1

See infra subsection B, page 14,
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A.

APPELLANT'S CONDUCT DOES NOT RISE TO THE
CULPABLE CONDUCT OF OTHER DEFENDANTS CONVICTED
OF "ARRANGING" THE DISTRIBUTION OF A CONTROLLED
SUBSTANCE.

In State v. Renfro, 735 P.2d 43 (Utah 1987), the Court
agreed upon three key activities which, when performed by the
defendant, constitute facts sufficient to support a conviction for
arranging to distribute a controlled substance:
On appeal, the State argues that defendant arranged
to distribute marijuana for value when he discussed
the purchase with officers, set a price for the
marijuana, and agreed to make the exchange. We
agree. [The statute] 2 makes it a crime "to agree,
consent, offer, or arrange to distribute . . . a
controlled substance for value." The undisputed
evidence clearly proved the elements of this crime.
Id, at 44.

In Renfro, defendant Mark Renfro was properly convicted

for arranging a transaction based upon the following behavior.

Two

undercover officers spoke with Renfro about purchasing some
marijuana.

Renfro went to another room in his house and returned

with the drug.

"He then agreed to sell marijuana to the officers,

exchanging four half-ounce bags of the substance for a total of two
hundred dollars in cash.
officers left."

After the transaction was completed, the

Renfro, 735 P.2d at 44.

The arrangement was

undisputed.
In sharp contrast to the facts of Renfro, however, the

2

The State argues that the principles of Utah Code Ann.
§ 58-37-8(1)(a)(iv) (1953) (repealed 1987) apply to the applicable
statute here, Utah Code Ann. § 58-37-8(1)(a)(ii) (Supp. 1989)
(effective until July 1, 1990), because of duplicative phrases and
meaning (T. 45). See also State v. Clark, 783 P.2d 68, 69 n.2 (Utah
App. 1989).
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evidence at Pelton's trial conspicuously lacked the same factual
circumstances necessary for a conviction.

Not only were the Renfro

circumstances not proven, the testimony of undercover narcotics
agent Albert Acosta ironically supported Pelton's innocence.

Acosta

admitted that Pelton never possessed the cocaine; Pelton never
directed the agent to the house or even discussed going to the house
where the cocaine was purchased; the agent never paid Pelton for the
drugs nor were any prices discussed; and Pelton never discussed the
quantity or quality of the drug with the agent (T. 23-25) (see
Addendum A which corrects the misstatement that Pelton received
marked money).

These inactions by Pelton establish that he did none

of the "arranging11 necessary for a conviction.
Indeed, the "classic case" of arranging to distribute a
controlled substance, State v. Ontiveros, 674 P.2d 103, 104 (Utah
1983), required substantially more affirmative behavior than the
inactions of Pelton.

The defendant in Ontiveros, Victor Ontiveros,

had asked an undercover narcotics agent if he wanted some
marijuana.

The agent said "yes."

Xd. at 104.

Ontiveros then made

"a phone call to see if someone else had any marijuana . . . and
while he was on the phone told [the agent] that he could get some
marijuana at $40 for a half ounce.
left for Provo."

Xd.

[The agent] agreed and the two

Ontiveros directed the agent to a location,

took $40 from the agent, entered a residence a short distance away,
and eventually "returned to the car to give [the agent] a plastic
bag containing marijuana."

Id.

These facts, while differing

greatly from the case at bar, clearly "show[ed] that [Ontiveros]
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acted as the officer's agent in making the purchase from a third
party."

Ontiveros, 674 P.2d at 104.

This type of relationship is

not present in the case at bar 3 and would not encompass the actions
of Appellant Pelton.
More recently, in State v. Clark, 783 P.2d 68 (Utah App.
1989), the activities performed by defendant Clark on behalf of an
agent were, again, far greater than the "activities" performed

3

Even the principles of agency have definable
boundaries. For example, in the much publicized murder case,
State v. Schreuder, 726 P.2d 1215 (Utah 1986), the Court found that
Richard Behrens, a long-time friend of defendant Frances Schreuder,
was not an accomplice to the first degree murder charge when his
only "intentional aid" was introducing the defendant to a hired
killer and attempting to procure a gun for her. "Merely introducing
one acquaintance to another, without more, is not sufficient to
constitute intentional aid of the magnitude to charge a defendant
with first degree murder." Id. at 1220 (emphasis added).
Similarly, the appropriate standard used in determining if
Appellant Pelton was an accomplice is whether he "could be charged
with the same offense as the defendant." Id. In Appellant's case,
the accomplice analysis would be based on the actions of Lorraine
Coates, whose activities more closely resemble what prior case law
has defined as "arranging." If, under Schreuder, Coates would not
have "arranged" the cocaine sale by merely introducing Acosta to
Paco, without more, it follows that the actions of Pelton, which
never rose to the level of an introduction, were also not sufficient
to constitute intentional aid of the magnitude to charge him with
arranging the distribution of a controlled substance. Appellant
submits that his "activity," without more and absent the additional
activities performed by the defendants in Renfro, Ontiveros, Clark,
and Harrison, would not have shown that he "acted as the officer's
agent in making the purchase from a third party." Ontiveros, 674
P.2d at 104. Appellant did not summon Paco at the 7-Eleven; rather,
Acosta told his informant to contact Coates, who then summoned Paco
(T. 9 ) . State v. Scott, 732 P.2d 117, 120 (Utah 1987) ("Under the
Act, it matters very much what the role of a defendant is in an
exchange of controlled substances for money").
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performed by Appellant Pelton.4

For instance, Clark admitted that

he and another drug trafficker were "partners."

Id.

He also

boasted that the cocaine was "extremely good," that he possessed
equipment "to rock the cocaine out," and that he had given a dealer
"two and a half grams of 're-rocked7 cocaine."

Id. at 68-69.

Appellant Pelton did none of these things.
Furthermore, Clark was so important to the sale that the
"details of an agreed-upon cocaine transaction were repeated in his
presence."

Id. at 69.

negotiations.
tailing car.

Pelton was not present during any

Finally, Clark actually "warned" the agent of a
Id.

No such warning ever occurred in Pelton's case;

Pelton was not even driving (T. 19). Thus, the decision of Clark,
while extending slightly the factual standards of Renfro and
Ontiveros, do not reach the insignificant "activity" of Pelton.
Nor does the decision of State v. Udell, 728 P.2d 131 (Utah
1986), wherein the court alluded to additional agency factors which
may constitute "arranging" a transaction.

4

Appellant questions whether State v. Clark, 783 P.2d 68
(Utah App. 1989), a case involving the distribution of a controlled
substance, would apply to Appellant Pelton's situation, a case
involving the arrangement of the distribution of a controlled
substance. The Clark opinion noted initially that the appeal
involved the "distribution of a controlled substance, a second
degree felony, in violation of Utah Code Ann. § 58-37-8(1)(a)(ii)
(Supp. 1989)," id., but stated subsequently that the "defendant was
properly convicted under section 58-37-8(1)(a)(ii) for arranging to
distribute a controlled substance even though the sale was never
actually consummated." Id. at 49. The standards for "arrange" and
"distribution" are different. Cf. Utah Code Ann. § 58-37-2(ii)
(Supp. 1989) (distribution requires a delivery); State v. Ontiveros,
674 P.2d 103 (Utah 1983); State v. Hicken, 659 P.2d 1038 (Utah 1983).
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Of particular significance in demonstrating that
Ontiveros [the defendant in the classic "arranging"
case] was acting merely as the officer's agent,
Ontiveros asked the officer to sell him some of the
marijuana . . . [Other factors include finding] and
[directing] the officer to another sellerf;] . . .
simply [making] an accomodation call to see if
someone else had any[;] . . . [directing] the
officer to the source and merely [carrying] the
money for the officer.
Id. at 134.

Again, these facts were not present in Appellant

Pelton's case.

Pelton did not ask Acosta for some of the cocaine

(T. 24). Pelton did direct Acosta to the 7-Eleven but it was
Acosta, not Pelton, who initiated the contact with Paco (T. 9 ) .
Pelton talked to Paco at the telephone booths but Paco remained
peripheral to the encounter until Coates, at the prompting of Acosta
and his informant, directed Paco to Acosta (T. 9, 22). Acosta
admitted, "there is absolutely no dispute that Lorraine [Coates]
made the contact with Paco [who, in turn, contacted Acosta] and Paco
made the contact with the people in the house . . . where the
cocaine was" (T. 26). Pelton made no telephone calls and his
conversation wtih Paco was not proven to be connected to the
transaction (T. 27). Also, Pelton did not carry Acosta's money
(T. 24).
In short, Appellant Pelton's "activity" does not amount to
the culpable conduct announced in Renfro, Ontiveros and Clark.

In

departing from, or failing to adhere to this type of "arranging"
conduct, the trial court declined to follow proper authority and did
not hold the State to its requisite standard of proof.
clearly erred in its decision.

The court

State v. Walker, 743 P.2d 191 (Utah
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1987); In re Winship, 397 U.S. 358 (1970).

B.

THE STATUTORY PROSCRIPTION AGAINST "ARRANGING"
MUST BE REASONABLY AND CONSTITUTIONALLY DEFINED
AS APPLIED TO APPELLANT.

At trial the State argued for, and the court seemed to rely
on the application of State v. Gray, 717 P.2d 1313 (Utah 1986)
(T. 46), which held, "any act in furtherance of 'arrang[ing] to
distribute . . . a . . . controlled substance' constitutes a
criminal offense pursuant to the statute."

Id. at 1321 (emphasis in

original) (citing State v. Harrison, 601 P.2d 922, 924 (Utah 1979));
(T. 44-46).

But the State's reliance on Gray is misguided.

The Court in Gray based its decision on State v. Harrison,
601 P.2d 922 (Utah 1979), wherein the Court upheld the
constitutionality of the predecessor statute to the one in the
instant action, Utah Code Ann. § 58-37-8(1)(a)(iv) (1953) (repealed
1987), and consequently affirmed defendant Harrison's conviction for
arranging the distribution of a controlled substance.

The Harrison

decision may have properly upheld the statute's constitutionality,
but the reasons supporting the decision, if followed, render
Appellant Pelton's conviction unconstitutional as applied to the
facts of his case.

Cf. Palmer v. Euclid, 402 U.S. 544 (1971) (an

ordinance was held unconstitutional as applied to a defendant who
could not reasonably understand what actions were prohibited under
the statute).
In Harrison, the Court first analyzed the applicable
statute:
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Except as authorized by this act, it shall be
unlawful for any person knowingly and intentionally:
• • •

(iv) to agree, consent, offer, or arrange to
distribute or dispense a controlled substance for
value or to negotiate to have a controlled substance
distributed or dispensed for value . . .
Harrison, 601 P.2d at 923 (emphasis added) (citing Utah Code Ann.
§ 58-37-8(1)(a)(iv)). The Court disposed of the defendant's
argument that the statute was unconstitutionally vague, noting, "[a]
statute may legitimately proscribe a broad spectrum of conduct with
a very few words, so long as the outer perimeters of such conduct
are clearly defined."

Harrison, 601 P.2d at 923.

But the Court

then defined the proscribed conduct in a vague and all-inclusive
manner:
The statute in question accomplishes this [defining
the proscribed conduct] by specifying that any
activity leading to or resulting in the distribution
for value of a controlled substance must be engaged
in knowingly or with intent that such distribution
would, or would be likely to occur.
Id. (emphasis added).

By proscribing "any activity," the Court has

extended the reach of the statute beyond that which is
constitutionally permissible.
activity is proscribed.

The statute does not specify that any

Rather, the statute made it unlawful only

if a person agreed, consented, offered, arranged, or negotiated the
distribution of a controlled substance.
activities are proscribed.

Clearly, these five

But the definition of each activity and

the factual circumstances which fall under each activity remains
unclear.
The definition of "arrangement" must be clear enough so
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that "[t]he citizen of average intelligence is left with no
confusion as to what type of conduct is forbidden."

Id. at 923-24.

Lending little guidance, this standard exacerbates the reference to
"any act in furtherance" of the arrangement, Gray, 717 P.2d at 1321,
since both standards leave much confusion for the average citizen.
Cf. Jacobellis v. Ohio. 378 U.S. 184, 197 (1964) (Stewart, J.,
concurring) (who defined pornography as "I know it when I see
it . . . » ) .
For example, if a patron in a restaurant overheard two
people discussing a drug transaction and the intended meeting place,
a 7-Eleven, should the patron be convicted for saying, "the quickest
way to 7-Eleven is Highway 101" or for helping them fix a flat
tire?

Probably not, even though the patron had knowledge and his

statement or act constituted "any activity" leading to the sale of
drugs.

Average citizens may frown upon or disapprove of such

actions, but the patron's conduct would not be forbidden.
Texas V. Johnson. 491 U.S.

Cf.

, 105 L.Ed.2d 342, 360, 109 S.Ct.

(1989) ("If there is a bedrock principle underlying the First
Amendment, it is that the Government may not prohibit the expression
of an idea [burning the American flag] simply because society finds
the idea itself offensive or disagreeable").
Moreover, the Harrison Court's analogy to conspiracy is
inapposite since "conspiracy" is specifically defined.
Ann. § 76-4-201 (1953) .

Utah Code

Thus, "any act in furtherance of the

conspiracy," while not explicitly listed, has definable boundaries
through the reference to the questioned act.
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Harrison. 601 P.2d at

924.

In contrast, since "arrange" is not clearly defined, the term

"any act in furtherance of an arrangement" also remains undefined.
Cf. Utah Rules of Professional Conduct, Rule 1.10, Comment (1988)
(since the term "impropriety" is undefined, the term "appearance of
impropriety" is question-begging and not recognized in Utah).
Therefore, the Harrison decision does not govern the case
at bar.

Even though the statute may be constitutional, its

application, through the nebulous phrase "any act in furtherance"
thereof, gives the Appellant insufficient notice of the proscribed
conduct and makes his conviction improper.5

C.

DARRIN PELTON DID NOT "ARRANGE" THE SALE
BECAUSE THE TRANSACTION WOULD HAVE OCCURRED
WITHOUT HIM.

The defendants in Renfro and Ontiveros were key "players"
who arranged the sale of drugs.

Without their involvement, the drug

transaction would not have occurred.

Appellant Pelton, on the other

hand, was not a necessary party to the sale of cocaine.

The

transaction would have (and, in fact, did) occur through the actions
of Lorraine Coates, Chris Baker, and Paco.

Appellant thus argues,

in the alternative, that since he did not act in a manner critical
to the sale's successful completion, he cannot be held liable under
the statute.

The holdings of Renfro and Ontiveros indicate, through

negative implication, that "but for" the defendant's participation,

5

In the alternative, the interpretation has been narrowed
by the recent decisions noted above and would not encompass the acts
of Appellant Pelton.
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a crime would not have occurred.

Cf. State v. Renfro. 735 P.2d 43

(Utah 1987); State v. Ontiveros, 674 P.2d 103 (Utah 1983); State v.
Devlin, 699 P.2d 717, 718 (Utah 1985) (an attempt to distribute case
in which the "Defendant had the intent to distribute and took a
substantial step toward the completion of the crime"); State v.
Harrison, 601 P.2d 922, 923 (Utah 1979) (wherein the defendant
directed the informant to a dealer and explained the desired
transaction in the presence of all the parties).

Here, the drug

transaction was already prearranged and Pelton's "participation" was
not required for the sale (T. 22) .
The alleged beginning of this "sting" operation began with
a telephone conversation between undercover narcotics agent Albert
Acosta and Lorraine Coates.

Acosta requested some cocaine from

Coates, who, in order to arrange the sale, contacted an alleged
cocaine dealer, "Paco" (T. 6, 15). Coates told Acosta to meet her
at a gas station on 53 00 South Redwood Road (T. 6 ) .
Acosta drove to the designated meeting place at 53 00 South
Redwood Road where, instead of meeting Coates, he met Chris Baker
(T. 7, 16). Baker entered Acosta's car, told him that the cocaine
could be picked up at an apartment complex at 5600 South and 900
East, and then rode together with Costa to the complex (T. 7, 17).
At the apartments, Darrin Pelton approached Acosta and
entered his car (T. 17-18).
(T. 17-18).

Baker moved to the back seat

After the parties introduced themselves, Acosta was

directed to a 7-Eleven, where they were to wait "for someone to
bring them cocaine" (T. 19). Baker and Pelton both directed Acosta
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to the 7-Eleven (T. 22); see also Suppression Motion at page 27,
lines 7-8 and page 29, lines 14-16 (April 27, 1989 and May 1, 1989)
(testimony of Patrick McCarthy, the narcotics agent in charge of
monitoring Agent Acosta during his encounters with the involved
parties).

According to Acosta, Pelton initiated the directions to

the 7-Eleven after entering the car (T. 8, 19). All three men (and
Acosta's confidential informant) then drove together to the 7-Eleven
(T. 8 ) . Once there, Baker and Pelton exited Acosta's car (T. 8 ) .
Pelton left Acosta's car, spoke to Paco, and went to a pickup truck
for his ride home (T. 20, 33). Pelton had no further involvement or
discussions with Acosta (T. 20, 26).
At this point, the real beginning of the transaction
occurred.

Acosta, while still situated at the 7-Eleven, had his

informant contact Lorraine Coates (T. 9 ) . The informant apparently
contacted Coates, in person, at the 7-Eleven (T. 9 ) . Acosta told
Coates that he was uncomfortable with Baker and Pelton and did not
want them there (T. 22). Acosta then asked if he could speak with
Paco (T. 9, 22). Coates contacted Paco and told him that Acosta
wanted to speak directly to him (T. 9 ) . Paco, at Coates' prompting
and obviously not pursuant to his prior conversation with Pelton,
approached Acosta at the 7-Eleven and told him to proceed to a gas
station on 1700 South and 1300 East (T. 10, 20). Paco, Coates and
Acosta's informant then rode with Acosta to the gas station (T. 10).
Shortly thereafter, Paco and Acosta made an agreement in
which Acosta would give $600 to Paco, who would exchange the money
at a nearby location for a half ounce of cocaine (T. 12). Paco
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followed through on the agreement, eventually returning to Acosta's
car with the cocaine (T. 12, 21).
In short, Pelton was not a necessary link in the
aforementioned chain of events.

The transaction occurred because of

Coates, Baker and Paco, or, alternatively, because of Coates and
Paco.

Pelton's involvement stems solely from his reference to the

7-Eleven and the cocaine.

No drugs were exchanged at the 7-Eleven.

Pelton exited Acosta's car and left for his ride home (T. 20, 33).
Pelton7s statement may, at best, evidence only his knowledge of the
transaction.

But it does not necessarily prove he actually

"arranged" the transaction.

He should not have been convicted for

his association with the involved parties.

CONCLUSION
Appellant respectfully requests that this Court reverse his
conviction and remand this case for a new trial.
jA
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